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Abstract 
This paper reports a qualitative study of 54 police drivers who were interviewed about 
their views on police driver training, driving strategies and their accident 
involvement. Study of the transcribed interviews indicated that officers constructed 
narratives of themselves as being highly aware of hazards presented by other road 
users and they used a variety of discursive devices to minimise their own culpability 
and attribute risk elsewhere. Rather than maintaining a straightforward ‘illusion of 
invulnerability’ they were formulating a ‘topography of risk’ in which they were 
responding to hazards presented by suspects or other road users. Their meticulously 
detailed accounts of the circumstances surrounding accidents serve to place them as 
knowledgeable and impartial participants and create a sense of expertise and 
authority. Training initiatives could profitably seek to challenge this ‘topography of 
risk’ and sense of authority so that drivers more fully appreciate the hazard they may 
present to themselves and the public. 
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Risk, discourse and the study of safety 
Many authors have recently highlighted the importance of psychosocial variables in 
an organisation’s ‘safety climate’ and a thorough examination of the values, norms 
and expectations of employees has been advocated as the key to understanding what 
safety at work means (Mearns & Flin, 2001). In the light of this, and in recognition of 
recent exhortations for occupational, organisational and safety studies to embrace the 
growing interest in qualitative research, (Johnson & Cassell, 2001), this paper reports 
on an interview study of police drivers. The aim of this study is to identify the reasons 
given for accidents by police drivers and examine how they formulate the causal 
scenarios leading up to their accidents and/or near-misses.  We shall attempt to show 
how a discursive approach, by virtue of its close attention to the officers’ discourse, 
can yield some novel, provocative and important suggestions for further research, 
training and skill development in the police service, and other occupational contexts 
where people routinely deal with hazardous situations. 
 
The social context of police accidents  
Road accidents involving police cars are increasingly plaguing the relationship 
between the police and the community and threaten the public’s perception of the 
integrity of the service. According to a recent report from the UK’s Police Scientific 
Development Branch (PSDB, 1997) the majority of police collisions occur either in 
response to an emergency call or in pursuit, with a minority also occurring on patrol 
and during training. The vast majority of police collisions are minor, causing slight 
injuries and vehicle damage. Whilst police vehicle accident data are difficult to 
obtain, a UK Police Research Group report (Rix, Walker and Brown, 1997) 
highlighted some of the tragic consequences. Between 1991 and 1995 there were over 
90 fatalities and about 1300 serious injuries caused during the execution of police 
duties. Of the fatalities, 83% were members of the public whilst 17% were amongst 
police officers themselves, of whom the majority were driving at the time of the 
collision. Whilst emergency response and pursuit driving are essential components of 
police work, death and injury to innocent bystanders in the execution of police duties 
are unacceptable especially if officers themselves are directly to blame for the 
accident. Regardless of the driving required for the execution of his or her duty, the 
public expect that officers will demonstrate the highest standards when discharging 
their duty. The UK’s Police Complaints Authority expressed concern, when in mid-
2001 its chair, Sir Alistair Graham disclosed a record annual number of deaths from 
traffic pursuits by police in Britain. He described the 25 deaths in the year 2000-01 as 
‘totally unacceptable’ (The Times, 11/7/2001). He also said ‘if there is no early 
improvement I recommend that the Home Office should seriously consider reviewing 
the law to ensure that police officers can break the road traffic law only if they are 
undertaking pursuits for a serious offence’. The steady rise over the years in the 
number of these kinds of accidents then highlights the urgency of finding new ways to 
make sense of the situation faced by police drivers and to discover ways of enhancing 
safety. This growing public and political concern was one of the major justifications 
for performing the present study. 
 
 
Psychological perspectives on road accidents  
It has been suggested that 90% of all accidents can be attributed to human error 
(McKenna, 1993). Despite this, drivers blame the weather, the vehicle or road 
conditions but it is not clear to what extent these self-serving biases are apparent 
amongst highly trained police officers. Police drivers need to use excessive speed in 
the execution of their duty and speed is strongly related to accident involvement 
(West et al, 1993) and excessive speed is argued to be the main contributor to road 
accidents (Johnson et al, 1980). Young men are more unrealistically optimistic about 
the negative consequences of speeding and unsafe driving (McKenna, 1993). The 
majority of drivers consider themselves to be more competent and safer than average 
driver, even after a serious accident requiring hospital treatment (Preston & Harris, 
1965; Svenson, 1981; Glendon et al, 1996) but it is not clear to what extent this bias 
applies to police drivers. The consequences of such an illusory sense of personal 
control when driving are likely to be even more catastrophic for police drivers who 
are able to disregard the traffic law and drive at speed to apprehend a suspect or 
respond to an emergency call. Stressful driving situations such as pursuit or 
emergency response can induce negative attitudes and emotions that impair driving 
performance by depleting information-processing resources. There are concerns that 
the increase in police collisions may be partly due to ‘red mist syndrome’. Red mist is 
a lay-term for the narrowing of attention through heightened psychological and 
physiological arousal in the pursuit of a goal (catching the suspect) during which 
officers may take undue risks. For example, Barton et al. (2000) found significant 
effects of high speed driving on police officers’ physiological arousal, emotion and 
willingness to shoot a target. In this study, officers misattributed their feelings of 
arousal caused by the high speed driving to the suspect and are therefore more likely 
to discharge their weapon. 
 
It is not surprising that drivers who drive for a living are at greater risk of an accident 
(Maycock, 1997). Traffic police may have more driving experience and training 
compared to standard police drivers but passing a skill-based police driving course is 
no guarantee that the skill will be exhibited and used appropriately during police 
driving. Racing drivers are highly skilled, but have worse on-the-road driving records 
than non-racing drivers (Williams and O’Neill, 1974). Whilst skill is important for 
safe driving, whether it is exhibited or not may depend on other factors, such as 
tendencies toward sensation seeking (Jonah et al, 2001) as well as demographic 
factors, traffic conditions (Li & Kim, 2000) and even the kinds of driving manoeuvre 
which are being undertaken, some of which are more likely to result in accidents 
(Clarke and Ward, 1999). 
 
In addition to the factors which are susceptible to quantitative investigation, it is 
important to note that accidents take place and are investigated within a complex 
psycho-social matrix. Driving and handling risk on the road requires a range of high 
level, conscious cognitive skills as well as performance-based skills in manoeuvring 
the car. In addition, the stories told by officers who have been involved in accidents 
will be revised and re-told as the incident is investigated, with consequent changes in 
story structure, emphasis and even arguably the putative underlying memory traces. 
Therefore an investigation of the way professional drivers account for the incidents in 
which they are involved is long overdue and in this investigation we will begin this 
process.  
 In the light of the foregoing concerns it was felt to be particularly important to 
address the psychosocial context of police accident involvement considering the 
dearth of literature on the subject.  Psychosocial factors in police accidents are 
especially important given the stressful nature of police driving and police work.  
Previous research on a professional driver group showed a relationship between a 
drivers vulnerability to stress at work and a likelihood of their being involved in 
accidents (Evans et al, 1987) and that the social work environment and the 
management style of an organisation may also contribute to stress and reduced safety  
(Kompier and Martino, 1995).  Therefore it is essential to examine these issues in 
accounting for police accidents. 
 
Perceived invulnerability and self-serving biases  
Most people underestimate their chances of meeting with accidents, illnesses or other 
misfortunes. Participants in a variety of studies dealing with hazards ranging from 
traffic to health are apt to overestimate their abilities to avoid problems (Weinstein, 
1980). In group situations, group members will claim a great deal of credit for the 
group’s achievements themselves and underestimate the contribution of other 
members (Ross and Sicoly, 1979). The sense of having better than average chances, 
abilities or personal qualities can be extremely robust. Snyder (1997) reported that his 
participants overestimated their life expectancy by nine years compared with actuarial 
data, even if they are made aware of this error. This attribution bias is pervasive. 
Training programmes have attempted to improve safety by enhancing awareness of 
hazards and possible performance impairments (Greenfield and Rogers, 1999). 
 
The belief that one is relatively invulnerable and can avoid the hazards which beset 
one’s peers is argued to have important psychological benefits. Janoff-Bulman (1998) 
argues that the ‘assumption of meaningfulness and a non-random world enables us to 
feel safe and secure’ (p. 99). Ironically, this sense of security may increase the risk of 
adverse events if it leads to a decrease in precautionary behaviour.  
 
The related issue of perceived control has also played a major part in studies of risk-
taking, where people appear more comfortable if they have a sense of control over 
events. This can lead to acceptance of a higher level of risk even if it is imaginary. 
Horswill and McKenna (1999) showed participants a video simulation of a drive 
through a variety of traffic situations. Those who had been asked to imagine that they 
were driving tended to prefer higher speeds than those who were asked to imagine 
that they were the passenger.  
 
In this paper therefore we will critically discuss the notion of perceived 
invulnerability by means of a qualitative investigation of police drivers, develop the 
implications of our findings to reconceptualise notions of risk taking in psychology 
and offer some suggestions for research and development in driver training which 
might enhance road safety. 
 
Alternative perspectives - shifting the paradigm  
There have been a number of calls for a reconceptualisation of the issues involved in 
psychological aspects of accidents and hazards. For example, Hirschhorn and Young 
(1993) advocated the study of organisational cultures and the scrutiny of narratives of 
good and bad protagonists in the organisation as a way of examining the ‘defence 
mechanisms’ that organisational subcultures use to contain anxieties concerning risk. 
Goldberg (2000) chides researchers for focusing on perceived invulnerability and 
advocates a focus on the perceived benefits of risky behaviour. Joffe (1999) suggests 
that research has focused largely on cognitive information processing aspects and 
neglected emotional aspects. Good et al (2000) promote a focus on the fearlessness 
and invulnerability which is a part of the masculine sex role in Western societies. All 
these lines of inquiry are prompted by the desire to challenge, revise or extend the 
concept of perceived invulnerability. Turning to the accounts of participants who are 
engaged in hazardous practices themselves might help to focus our search for 
theoretical development in this area. 
 
Traditionally, the study of risks, hazards and accidents has assumed that there is a 
relationship between the individual’s perception of invulnerability and their 
propensity for risk taking, leading to higher rates of accident involvement. In this 
view, risk-takers are unaware of the hazard, are not knowledgeable about precautions, 
or are not mindful of the consequences (Clarke & Ward, 1999; D’Amico & Fromme, 
2000). Consequently, from the very inception of driver education (Personnel Research 
Foundation, 1938) efforts at reducing hazardous behaviour have addressed these 
issues. 
 
We intend to begin the process of making sense of driving hazards, accidents and near 
misses by critically interrogating some of the assumptions, theories and findings in 
the literature on safety, accidents and human error, using the interview material from 
police officers. This will offer a contrast to much of the literature on accidents, road 
safety and risk where the majority of research is quantitative in nature, and has 
focused on demographic or psychometric correlates of accident involvement. The 
omission of participants’ accounts of accidents and their likelihood is unfortunate 
because this might lead to some radically different theoretical formulations of 
accidents and suggest new avenues of investigation, education and policy. Attention 
to these accounts is also important because they often form the basis of any further 
investigation of accidents, whether by academic researchers or in the form of 
inquiries undertaken by statutory bodies. Even physical evidence such as skid marks 
and impact traces is often interpreted in the light of participants’ accounts of how they 
occurred. The pervasiveness of personal accounts is inescapable and the present paper 
was conceived in an attempt to establish some of their discursive features and to 
attempt to discern the implications of these for theoretical accounts of accidents.  
 
Method 
This investigation is based on a corpus of material derived from a group of 54 officers 
who were interviewed as part of a larger study of police driving. They were employed 
by two large urban police service and were recruited via newsletter, website and 
direct contact. All had agreed to participate in an interview as part of the research. 
The average age was 37 and had held a full driving licence on average for 18 years. 
During the previous three years, 27 had been involved in a blameworthy collision, 11 
had been involved in a non-blameworthy collision and 16 had been accident-free. 
Thirty nine had received advanced police driver training and 14 were trained to a 
standard level.  
 
The interviews were originally intended to elicit accounts of accidents and near 
misses, views on the suitability and appropriateness of training and the possibility that 
organisational factors such as target response times and understaffing might 
contribute to accidents. In addition we inquired about the possibility that drivers 
might be overly emotional when involved in pursuits and emergency responses and 
suffer so called ‘red mist syndrome’. In order to enable officers to freely express their 
opinions during the interview they were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and 
efforts were made to ensure that this was maintained throughout the investigation. For 
example, details were removed from the data that might identify individual officers. 
Confidentiality was particularly important in this study because of the officers’ 
apprehension that accounts of accidents and comments about the organisation might 
result in repercussions for them. Advantageously, the researchers were not members 
of the police services concerned and could readily assure participants of their 
independence. 
 
Analysis strategies were prompted by several concerns. First, whether theories of 
accident causation involving a putative sense of invulnerability were sustained by the 
data. Second, we were concerned to follow the lead of grounded theory methods 
where it is argued that theoretical formulations should be allowed to arise from the 
data itself in a bottom up manner (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Thus, an initial intuition that the study of accounts of accidents could shed light on 
what the participants were expressing was extended into a close reading to extract 
themes relating to the management and self-government of what they saw to be risks 
and hazards. The strength of the grounded theory approach is illustrated by the way 
that existing theoretical presuppositions about the subjective sense of invulnerability 
and risk taking were challenged by the data. The second strand of our analytic 
strategy was to follow the lead of Potter and Edwards (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 2000; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) who argue that language - such as that in 
which people talk about accidents, near misses and the like - is a form of social 
action. Rather than merely describing the state of the world, language is a transaction 
in which the actors try to perform some social business. Thus, participants’ 
formulations of accident involvement might facilitate courses of action - for example, 
they might delimit culpability, secure the speaker's status or assign blame elsewhere. 
In doing this we were attentive to the kinds of resources of meaning speakers draw 
upon, the words they choose to express and formulate events and the way they 
managed their ‘stake’ in the events so as to appear less blameworthy. A third source 
of inspiration is ethnomethodology (Sacks, 1992, Forrester & Ramsden, 2000). 
Accordingly, we will place centre-stage the participants’ accounts of what they were 
doing and take these as our starting point for interpretation and attempts to theorise. It 
is not our concern to determine whether the accounts presented here are literally true. 
Rather, we are interested in elucidating their formulation of the events and the risks 
involved and considering the implications for psychological theories of accident 
causation. In this way we hope to develop new tools to obtain some purchase on an 
area of human experience which is very difficult to study because of its extremely 
transient nature. The thematic structure of the presentation of results is based on the 
broad themes that emerged in the participant's discussion of the issues - as grounded 
theorists would advocate - and own-words quotations are used extensively so as to 
allow an appreciation of how respondents expressed their views. 
 
Results and discussion 
The results section is divided into two main sections. First, we shall present a broad 
overview of participants’ responses to the interview questions and go on to consider 
in a more detailed fashion the structure of their accounts of accidents and near misses. 
Overview of responses to interview questions  
Interviewer: When was the last time you received any driver training? 
The time elapsed since officers had last received any driver training varied from less 
than one year to over 25 years. On average it was approximately five years since they 
last attended a driver training course (mean = 5.50, SD = 5.39). 
Interviewer: What was the main noticeable improvement in your driving after the 
course? 
As a result of training, more than half of those interviewed believed that they had 
improved their control of the car, reaction time, confidence and driving tactics. About 
39% saw an improvement in hazard awareness and a fifth saw an improvement in 
driving safety. A somewhat smaller group believed that they drove more cautiously 
and slowly as a result of driver training. 
Interviewer: In what way could any of the police driver training courses you’ve 
been on be improved? 
Approximately 44% of those questioned believed that there should be no driving test 
during training, suggesting that officers should be assessed as they go along. Forty 
one percent believed that the police driver training courses should be longer, 
suggesting that there is insufficient time to cover all the skills necessary on the 
courses they have attended. Nearly 28% felt that there was a need for more specific 
driver training such as night-time driving, skid pad training and driving in unfamiliar 
settings. More than 22% believed there should be more response and pursuit driver 
training available.  
Interviewer: Do you think you would benefit from any further training? 
A large majority (89%) felt that they would benefit from further training. 
Interviewer: Do you think that some police drivers you know would benefit from 
further training? 
More than half confirmed that drivers they know would benefit from further training 
because they are inexperienced and/or lack sufficient training. Respondents suggested 
that these officers needed reassessments. Almost 28% of the sample knew someone 
who drove dangerously. A further 28% mentioned that some of their colleagues broke 
the rules on ‘blues and twos’, were complacent, or forgot their training once they 
were back on the job. 
Interviewer: Do you think some police officers are naturally good drivers?  
Less than a quarter of the participants believed there was such a thing as a naturally 
good driver, implying that most believed that driving was a learned skill. Of this small 
number, more than 70% felt that good drivers have naturally well co-ordinated 
driving skills and react accordingly. About 29% felt that naturally good drivers were 
safe at high speeds and had a calm personality. Nearly a quarter believed that attitude, 
confidence, and general enjoyment of driving was a factor. 
Interviewer: Have you ever terminated a pursuit because it was too dangerous to 
continue? 
Whilst many officers may not have been involved in situations that required them to 
pursue a vehicle, of those sampled, a fifth had terminated a pursuit because of the 
risks involved. 
Interviewer: What do you think are the special qualities a good police driver needs? 
Officers mentioned several factors that were necessary for good police driving. More 
than 52% believed awareness and appreciation of danger were important and a further 
52% mentioned attitude, confidence, maturity and common sense. Half of the officers 
sampled felt that patience, restraint and calmness were important. Almost 46% of the 
responses also suggested that driving skills such as quick responses, strategic driving 
and good driving judgement were special qualities for police driving. Here, officers 
appear to have a good understanding of the sorts of skills that are essential for safe 
driving.  
Interviewer: To what extent are collisions due to factors within the organisation? 
The majority of the participants (41%) believed that workforce problems (such as 
workforce shortages or people doing the wrong job) were partly responsible for police 
collisions. Over 39% of the sample suggested those stress-related problems such as 
fatigue and job demands were organisational factors contributing to the number of 
police collisions. This supports the inclusion of cognitive skills training to change 
maladaptive driving appraisal and coping strategies within police driver training. 
Over a third of those sampled mentioned the problem of response time targets leading 
to some officers taking unnecessary risks in order to reduce response times. Nearly 
24% suggested collisions were the result of lack of training and 20% said some of the 
police vehicles are not suitable for the job they are required to do. 
Interviewer: On a scale of one to ten what are the chances of you having a 
blameworthy collision in the next 12 months? 
This item is a measure of officer’s perception of risk. As we have noted, risk 
perception has been linked to risk-taking behaviour, and may also influence driving 
performance and psychometric test scores. Responses to this question ranged from 
zero (seven officers believed they had no chance of being involved in a blameworthy 
collision) through to seven (suggesting a belief that an at-fault accident is almost 
inevitable). However, the mean was relatively low at 2.18 (SD = 1.80). 
Interviewer: On a scale of one to ten what are the chances of you having a non-
blameworthy collision in the next 12 months? 
Risk perception was somewhat elevated for non-blameworthy collisions as officers 
were prepared to accept that there might be an increased risk of being involved in a 
collision that was not their fault. The mean score here was almost double that of the 
mean for a blameworthy collision (3.54, SD = 2.40 compared with 2.18) showing a 
large discrepancy between judgements of risk for blameworthy and non-blameworthy 
collisions. Therefore, officers generally believed themselves to be at a low risk of 
being involved in a blameworthy collision, thus apparently demonstrating an illusory 
sense of their own personal control whilst driving. 
 
Accounting for accidents: Reformulating invulnerability 
A closer scrutiny of the accounts of drivers will now be presented, especially where 
this involves their accounts of accidents and near misses. This qualitative analysis 
will allow us to cast some new and critical light on the idea of invulnerability. 
 
Much of the literature we reviewed earlier led us to expect that a traditional ignorance 
of hazard, underestimation of risk and blaming other people would appear prominent 
in the accounts. Indeed, for some informants this was true, but we detected much 
counterintuitive evidence that other accident-accounting strategies prevailed, as we 
shall illustrate. 
 
The excess of awareness: Detail as a resource for rationality 
One of our concerns, borrowed from discursive psychology is the way in which 
participants manage the issues of stake and interest in their accounts of events. That 
is, this perspective assumes that accounts are not merely reflections of events but are 
carefully constructed so as to present the protagonist in a favourable light and to 
deflect possible criticisms. At the same time, the protagonists will sometimes go to 
great pains to display their neutrality and try to convince the hearers that they do not 
have an axe to grind (Potter, 1996). 
 
The motivation to select amongst possible formulations and construct versions of 
events in a favourable manner might be especially acute amongst those who have had 
an accident. Choice of language and styles of formulation might have important 
consequences for the narrator who might face sanctions both within the organisation 
and more broadly within the judicial system. 
 
Thus, a great many of the accounts of accidents which participants had been involved 
in were presented in terms of an excess of awareness and a surfeit of rationality. As if 
attempting to deflect an implication that they might have acted hastily or rashly, the 
officers were apt to provide elaborate justifications in their accounts (Scott & Lyman, 
1968; Harre & Secord, 1974).  
 
The benefits of risk and the sense of urgency  
(Officer 1): “I had an accident, which was only a small accident, but in hindsight, 
because I tried to do something to save somebody’s life but yet the bloke survived but 
I had an accident as a result of it.” 
Thus, in this formulation, it is not a risk blindly taken but one which results from a 
careful consideration of the relative benefits of different courses of action. Students of 
moral development might note an uncanny resemblance between this account and 
Kohlberg’s ‘Heinz and the druggist’ moral dilemma (Kohlberg, 1972). The ‘small’ 
accident is contrasted with the presumably moral and practical benefit of saving a life. 
This formulation of accidents as being relatively insignificant is not accomplished as 
a result of feelings if invulnerability in any simple sense but is achieved by carefully 
counterposing the significant elements in the story. This can be seen in more detail; as 
the officer describes the incident in more detail.  
Interviewer: Please describe what happened. 
Officer 1: “An old man got knocked down at a zebra crossing. The ambulance 
couldn’t keep him alive because he was dead they said the helicopter was going to 
land on the junction. I went over and they said ‘oh no they can’t land there because of 
the wires, they are going to land down the road but we need the crew here as quick as 
possible. As is normal I drove up the road, the north back traffic was all stationary it 
was solid I drove south on the road to the school where they had landed. The 
helicopter medical crew ran out and jumped in the car. I'm now in the position where 
I’m two hundred yards from the old boy behind me, and two hundred yards to the 
next junction to turn around in a narrow street which is reduced by half its length and 
half its width by a queue. The choice is to drive down to the next junction turn at the 
junction and drive back up again or reverse, I decided to reverse. I reversed in a 
straight line I had plenty of vision, thirty miles an hour in reverse, then as I 
approached the front of the queue of stationary traffic there is a PC is standing there. I 
sounded the horn three times, with that the police officer stopped the traffic that was 
coming up the side turning. I mistakenly believed that he had stopped the traffic in 
order to let me past, to get to the accident. What had happened, he had been told to 
stop the traffic to let the buses go the wrong side, passing the accident. He had already 
spoken to the bus driver, so when he stopped the traffic, unaware of my presence 
because the siren did not work, I was mistakenly believed that he had stopped the 
traffic because he has heard the horn to let me go the bus driver has not bothered 
looking. I have slowed down as I’ve crept past the bus, as I have crept past the bus the 
bus has pulled out and hit the side of the car. I carried up another thirty yards, 
dropped the medical crew off, and came back to assess the accident. Most people 
would normally give you two points for that but there is a certain politics at work that 
resulted in a suspension.” 
 
There are a number of important issues in this quote for an understanding of 
vulnerability and invulnerability. First, in common with many accounts of accidents 
in our corpus of data, note the richness of the narrative. He outlines in meticulous 
detail the circumstances leading up to the accident, and that his whole sequence of 
manoeuvres were occasioned by people and conditions other than himself, the wires 
over the road junction, the decision of the helicopter pilot to land elsewhere, the 
traffic conditions, even his colleague stopping vehicles emerging from a side road. 
The account of the accident is formulated so as to make it seem to have occurred not 
as a result of a blatant disregard of risk, but as a misunderstanding - thinking a 
colleague was stopping the traffic for him, but was in fact stopping it so as to allow a 
bus to proceed. Thus a process of decision making which is foregrounded in the 
account the possible hazard of reversing at speed is ‘neutralised’ (Matza 1967). He 
travels at ‘thirty miles an hour’ - not in excess of the typical UK speed limit in urban 
areas - and has ‘plenty of vision’ (despite there being a medical crew in the car). 
Indeed, he has an almost telepathic - albeit post hoc - awareness of the state of mind 
of other parties: his colleague was ‘unaware’ and the bus driver has ‘not bothered 
looking’ - an implied carelessness which helps to prepare the scene for subsequent 
events - the bus driver ‘pulled out and hit the side of the car’. The lexical choices too 
are part and parcel of this formulation. The bus driver ‘hit’ the ‘side’ of the narrator’s 
car. Moreover, as he puts it twice, he ’crept’ (rather than ’reversed’ or ‘drove’) past 
(rather than ‘into’) the bus. In a sense then, we can hear how he is heading off 
possible alternative formulations of the same events which might emphasise that the 
protagonist had reversed at speed into an oncoming bus. To reiterate, we are not 
seeking to assess whether we agree with the truth of his account as a description of 
events. What we are attempting to show is how he constructs a sense of the truth in 
situ, which emphasises his own rationality and safety and the punishment as an 
overreaction. The distance he covered after the collision was a mere ‘thirty yards’ and 
not, for example the kind of distance that would count as a ‘failure to stop after an 
accident’.  
 
Here the excess of awareness and the meticulous detail of the participants account is 
also a resource on which the teller of tales of accidents can draw as a means of 
making the account convincing to hearers. This has also been demonstrated more 
experimentally in the study of eyewitness testimony (Bell & Loftus, 1988; 1989). 
Within the study of storytelling about unusual or hard-to-believe events it has been 
noted that detail is deployed as a means of authenticating the speaker’s account 
(Wooffitt, 1992). Empirical research on memory for events in the street as people go 
about their daily business typically shows very low rates of recall, and theories such 
as ‘urban overload’ enjoyed a brief vogue in the 1970s to account for this (Milgram, 
1970). The key feature here is the way memory - detailed, authoritative and 
(apparently) impartial - is usable by the participants as a resource to construct their 
accounts. This recollects Edwards’s (1997) thesis that what might appear to be 
cognitive entities - memories, scripts, attributions and so on - do not simply underlie 
discourse and propel it (as with classic cognitive psychology), but are participants’ 
categories. They are used in discourse to accomplish such things as descriptions, 
claims, accusations, and accounts of error. A memory such as this is the warrantable 
outcome of interpretative work by the participants in interaction.  
 
The deployment of apparently detailed, detached and authoritative memories in 
accounts of accidents was a feature of most other narratives of accidents in the corpus 
of data, as we shall show below. 
 
Accounting for accidents - the dialectic of disinterest and justification 
The interactional and professional problem faced by officers who have had accidents 
is to minimise their own culpability and to account for their actions so they seem 
careful, safe, reasonable, and warranted by the circumstances despite their having 
ended up crashing. To examine how the disinterested style of narration might help 
them accomplish self serving interactional ends, let us consider two more extracts 
before offering a more extended commentary on the issue. 
Interviewer: How many blameworthy collisions have you had? 
Officer 2: “One about four months ago. I was pulling up outside the police station, it 
was very busy and there was a queue of traffic. I noticed a woman overtaking on the 
wrong side of the road and she was going against the traffic. She was driving with her 
left hand on the steering wheel and holding the phone in her right. She has then gone 
up to the junction to turn right causing a car coming across the junction to slam on its 
brakes. I went to pursue her and I didn’t have time to turn on my blues and twos, as I 
turned the corner I was coming into the junction, I was conscious of avoiding the cars 
on my left and smashed wing mirrors with a transit van coming on my right.” 
 
The accident described by Officer 2, in common with many others, is nested in a 
detailed account of conditions which had a bearing on the events. There are some 
detailed descriptions of traffic conditions and the lexical choices themselves convey a 
sense of how the accident had occurred. A ‘transit van’ might be wider than a private 
car and the term might allude to stereotypes in the UK of ‘white van man’. Thus, 
there is a meticulously crafted quality to the reality which is constructed around the 
accident, where a variety of devices are used to construct the physical features of the 
scene and the narrator as a person who was aware and in control of the situation. 
Despite the regrettable events, the overwhelming impression of rationality and 
awareness of other road users prevailed. Indeed, this contrasts with the apparent 
disregard of safety in his description of the target, driving on the wrong side of the 
road whilst telephoning and forcing other motorists to take evasive action. Again, 
rather than a simple description connoting a sense of invulnerability, this officer has 
crafted an account which emphasises both a meticulous awareness of risk and a 
justification for his actions in terms of the hazards being presented by the other 
motorist. Her disregard for safety is almost confirmed by the officer having an 
accident - despite his hyperalertness and his eschewing distractions like turning on his 
lights and sirens - so the target’s behaviour is made to seem even more irresponsible.  
A similar impression is given in this second example: 
Interviewer: How many blameworthy collisions have you had? 
Officer 3: One last September, driving down the country lanes in the early hours of 
the morning. One of my colleagues was in a pursuit and I was basically playing catch-
up.  I was going through the lanes that I didn’t know very well, and I could see the 
lights of the other cars in the distance ahead of me. The road was dry but I was 
approaching a bend that had a lot of tree cover, which I believe, kept the road 
underneath wet, I braked very hard. To this day I can’t, the vehicle has ABS, but I 
can’t remember the ABS cutting in. All I remember is the wheels locking ahead of me 
and going straight in to the bank and damaged the underneath of the vehicle. 
 
Here again there is a demonstration of awareness of the conditions and the 
capabilities of the vehicle and how they might affect the handling in that situation. 
The formulation of his inferential framework - that the tree cover might keep the road 
underneath wet (rather than keeping it dry), and that the ABS may not have acted - 
not only minimise culpability but also demonstrate awareness. Seeing the lights ahead 
of him implies that he was not going much faster than the cars ahead, which had 
presumably successfully negotiated the road shortly before the protagonist himself. 
Indeed, his accident is almost a vindication of the view that the vehicles in front were 
taking some severe risks in travelling so fast. 
 
When police officers have accidents there will be many opportunities to rehearse and 
reproduce their accounts, as the events surrounding the accident are investigated. 
Indeed, they may try to produce an account which minimises their culpability and 
establishes them as competent drivers to avoid negative consequences like points on 
the police driving licence (‘if you get ten then you are banned.’ - Officer 4) or 
prosecution. Unlike the accident investigator, our interest here is not in the literal 
truth of these accounts. We are in no position to judge the closeness of the transit van, 
the wetness of the road, much less the consciousness of the drivers in the moments 
before an accident. Rather, our interest is in how these kinds of accounts of accidents 
are constructed and the implications of this for the discursive structure within which 
the officers are embedded, for we would argue that the minutiae and detail of the 
accounts is itself conditioned by the narrative context of the events. The officers are 
keen to convince listeners that they were acting to the highest standard of awareness 
even when the accident occurred and were not only aware of the immediate road 
conditions but were actively making inferences about the likely risks they were 
encountering. These accidents are unfortunate but still within the realm of what was 
orderly, conscious and rational. The use of technical detail may be a strategy of 
legitimation (Seguin, 2001). Thus, the regime of training, inquiries, accountability 
and public policy informs officers’ narratives - and arguably their consciousness - in 
inculcating this strategy for storytelling. As Schmid and Fielder (1999, p. 808) argue, 
‘causal knowledge is built into language as a system’ and officers are adept at 
deploying these causal implications in their storytelling accomplishments.  
 
From the point of view of the theories and findings in the introduction, we can see 
some of the discursive mechanics which lie behind the ‘false uniqueness’ effect or the 
‘illusion of invulnerability’. Rather than an unthinking ignorance of risk, participants 
are constructing a complex topography of risk where they are a low risk point. Other 
people, road conditions or even the cars themselves are the source of problems 
whereas officers depict themselves hard at work managing them and are thus unlikely 
to construct themselves as being the hazard. 
 
The detail of their accounts, rather than being a simple reflection of memory, is also a 
resource participants are able to deploy in making their accounts convincing - a 
technique which is important in factual discourse (Wooffitt, 1992; Potter 1996). In 
addition, eyewitness testimony research indicates that detailed accounts are more 
believable than those where details are sparse (Bell and Loftus, 1988; 1989).  
 
Easthope (1986) argues that this 'clear and transparent style' (which can be seen in the 
officers’ accounts) was developed in the period surrounding the English Civil War by 
writers determined to argue clearly about religious and political issues. It purports to 
be '. . .styleless, a clear window on reality that presents the truth nakedly and 
objectively as it is without any subjective feeling or attitude getting in the way' (1986, 
p 79). This mode of writing, in professional contexts and in social science is pre-
eminently about someone else, someone 'other' than the author (Brown et al, 1996; 
Gunnarson et al, 1997). Thus, this adds to the impression that the causal agents of 
hazard are other people and their ill-thought and myopic actions whereas the officers’ 
traffic awareness and impartiality is part of their identity as low risk points in the 
urban landscape. 
 
Officers as active managers of risk: hanging back and easing off. 
Many of the officers presented themselves as active managers of risk and described 
themselves undertaking elaborate sequences of judgement recollecting Adam Smith’s 
‘rational economic man’ about risks and likely benefits of driving fast to emergencies 
or to pursue suspects.  
 
Officer 5:  . . . I sort of made a mental decision after that [accident] that, although I've 
been involved in pursuits since I have and I have had damage to the vehicle but that 
wasn’t my fault. But I make the decision that I was always going to try and consider, 
what I was got back to earlier on, I’m gonna get there but I’ll get there thirty seconds 
later which is not gonna make that much difference and I’m gonna get there in one 
piece. But I think I I don’t suppose you get many people that would admit to red mist. 
 
The sense of risk or hazard management is depicted as extending even further back, 
before the decision to respond. However, deciding not to race to an incident might 
place the officer at odds with colleagues: 
Interviewer: To what extent are collisions due to factors within the organisation? 
Officer 6: Yes a lot I think because of pressures on controlling staff, a lot of the 
controlling staff are civilians not police officers, there are a couple of police officers. 
If there are any immediate response calls out standing they start screaming down the 
radio about it. ‘We haven’t got any one to go to this call’, it’s main channel, the 
people in the controlling room get too over emotional about it, ‘there’s a fight, and 
he’s got a knife’. My view is I don’t care, whatever the job is, if doing it is about 
response time it does not interest me at all. I have actually called up and downgraded 
the call. I’ve actually pulled up and said ‘I'm not going on a response because I'm not 
going into that load of old rubbish, it’s not worth it, I'm telling you, I don’t care what 
you think’.  
Interviewer: You feel like you are in a position to judge it better yourself? 
Officer 6: Yes I am, its down to the driver, yes I am but a lot of people don’t they just 
wait for some rubbish call. They say [name] will do it but it’s not worth it, most 
alarms, you know if you should go to an alarm on an immediate call. When do you 
actually catch a burglar because of an alarm, not many, you do sometimes, it’s just 
knowing, a lot of its local knowledge. 
 
Here, the participant elaborates a complex rationale for not speeding and ends by 
downgrading the element of speed in successful policing. Local knowledge is more 
important. Thus his description of his working style is of someone who takes his time, 
ignores the urgency expressed by control room staff, and relies not on an instant 
response but on local knowledge. Thus, despite his maverick approach when it comes 
to organisational efficiency criteria, he is able to show himself retaining fidelity to the 
purpose of policing.  
 
The participants presented themselves as active managers of risk whilst driving too: 
Officer 7: [I] had to take the junction roundabout on the wrong side because there was 
a build up of traffic. I was aware there was a blind spot where people come straight 
onto zebra crossing I was doing the minimal minimal speed. Someone ran across from 
that blind spot right in front of me even though the lights and sirens were going. But 
because I was going slow and aware of the hazard I was able to stop in time and 
safely. 
Or, alternatively:  
Interviewer:  Please describe the last ‘near miss’ when driving on duty 
Officer 8: To be honest I can’t think of one, you have situations were members of the 
public do things that are out of the ordinary. But to be honest because you’ve seen 
them, you’re waiting to see what they are going to do, I wouldn’t really class that as a 
near miss. Because we would just stop and let them get on with what they are going to 
do. That’s the majority of it the unpredictability of the general public. What we do is 
we try to get eye contact with the driver, because if you have eye contact with them 
then they have normally seen you and you can drive through that hazard without the 
fear that they will come out. They might still come out but you would be going at a 
speed where you can avoid it, you can stop. But no I can’t think of a near miss 
because you always drive to react to what’s coming along anyway. 
 
As well as presenting the protagonists as actively managing risks these two extracts 
have a further feature in common. That is, the public are seen as unpredictable, who 
don’t see the police car or who chance crossing the road or pulling out in front of it. 
Here, the participants are working with categories of people - themselves versus the 
‘general public’. They are mobilising ‘locally used, invoked and organised 
membership categories’ (Hester, 1997) and this enables them to call upon what is 
conventionally known about police and the public. This enables speakers to draw 
upon larger scale historically embedded discursive formations where the police might 
be identified, for example, as sources of expertise in road safety. These grander 
resources of meaning and order interpenetrate the interview interaction (Forrester & 
Ramsden, 2000; Hutchby, 1996). The police then are able to render an account of 
themselves where they have special skills of hazard anticipation which not only set 
them apart from the ‘general public’ but also allow them to safeguard the public’s 
well-being, despite the public’s myopia for risk. This formulation neatly inverts the 
usual implication that speeding drivers are hazardous and activates instead the 
implication that the public themselves are the obstacles and the police are struggling 
heroically to avoid them. 
 
Thus, the police are managers of the risks which are set in front of them by other 
people. Here it is worth returning to the idea of perceived invulnerability described 
earlier. The officers quoted above indicate not so much a straightforward sense of 
invulnerability - for they are quick to show awareness of hazards presented in fast 
driving - but a sense that they are members of a privileged category who deal capably 
with hazards presented by other people but do not themselves constitute a hazard to 
others. Thus, there is a sense of special status to the membership category they 
construct themselves into. 
 
The sense of a rational approach to hazards is further enhanced by the elaborate 
discourse on road conditions and other drivers’ behaviour which is present in these 
accounts. The officers then are in a privileged category characterised by rationality. 
 
The construction of rationality and the control of emotions 
The rationality that was espoused by the officers was not something that existed 
naturally. When the concept was unpacked, it was described a being the result of a 
meticulous process of organizing and controlling one’s self and one’s feelings. 
Interviewer: What do you think are the special qualities a good police driver needs? 
Officer 4: To control adrenaline, that effects for me personally pursuit driving only. 
Driving to emergency calls I find that as much part and parcel of my daily work and I 
don’t get a buzz out of it, I’m just doing what I’m here to do and touch wood three 
years on I haven’t been involved in collisions and I’ve been doing that daily. During a 
pursuit I get a huge adrenaline flow there is no question about that and my senses get 
very very sharp and heightened. You need to be able to control that so that you don’t 
get overconfident, go into hazards too quickly, brake too late, that type of thing, the 
thrill of the chase. As an advanced driver certainly if you can control that then you’re 
nine tenths of the way there. 
 
Here, the participant is laying out the ground rules or prerequisites for the rationality 
and awareness which are so prevalent in participants’ accounts of their driving 
behaviour and accident involvement. In other words, he is regulated to the point 
where the process of emergency driving is rendered mundane - ‘part and parcel of my 
daily work’ and is therefore quotidian and unremarkable rather than something that he 
gets a ‘buzz out of’. In presenting and managing his identity as a driver, he presents 
himself as a master of self management. The ‘huge adrenaline flow’ - itself a 
rhetorical flourish rather than the result of blood tests - is not described as being 
disabling, but is something that makes his senses ‘very very sharp and heightened’ 
Indeed, this is a large part - ‘nine tenths’ - of being an advanced driver. Again, the use 
of technical terms, the precise estimation of proportions ‘nine tenths’ - the recognition 
of pitfalls - ‘overconfidence’ - presents a picture of superior awareness, not only of 
the external geography of hazard, but the interior psychological landscape too - 
almost as if the machinery inside the person was susceptible to rational management 
in the same way as the skill of driving itself. The argument that new technologies and 
working practices lead to shifts in consciousness and new ways of conceiving of the 
self has been made most forcefully by Rose (e.g. 1999). The psyche then, in this 
officer’s formulation is something that is not only susceptible to this kind of self 
examination but also improvement and redevelopment.  
General Discussion 
Having examined the transcripts, what are we to make of the theoretical concepts with 
which we began this paper? What can we say about cognitive aspects of risk taking 
such as the illusion of invulnerability? The present study has highlighted that the 
classic psychological formulation of risk-taking is called into question and revised by 
a close attention to the interview material. That is, it is difficult to see the participants’ 
accounts yielding any straightforward support for a model of risk taking and human 
error which emphasises ignorance, underestimation of risk or a sense that ‘it won’t 
happen to me’. Rather, the officers construct themselves as a low point in their 
cultural topography of risk - “I believe that we are quite a low insurance risk” (Officer 
9) - and as contending with the hazards poised by other road users. This in turn means 
that they are presented as representing safety rather than hazard, and by dint of cost-
benefit analysis, to be managing risk in a downward direction for themselves and the 
public, all of which is contingent on their keeping the malfeasant ‘adrenaline’ under 
control through a process of self awareness and self management. 
 
Much psychological investigation of human responses to risk, chance and uncertainty 
has been haunted by the legacy of psychoanalysis. The frequently-detected self-
serving biases and illusions of invulnerability are often assumed to reflect some 
defence against the anxiety that might arise when people are confronted with a 
chaotic and threatening environment. This assumption has led educators to try to 
inculcate an awareness of hazards, a ‘realistic’ appreciation of the risks involved and 
a desire to take precautions. However, one implication of the material presented here 
is that this may have the very opposite effect in that it will give people more resources 
with which to justify risky courses of action. In a sense, it might help them make 
better excuses equip them with new techniques for undertaking a discursive process 
of neutralising them, so as to facilitate risky courses of action. 
 
Whilst this may seem like a paradoxical assertion, it is not beyond the bounds of 
possibility, and has parallels with some well established traditions and findings in 
psychology. People report being comfortable with a higher level of risk if they believe 
that safety features such as anti-lock brakes are present (Jonah et al, 2000). Indeed, 
risk homeostasis theory (McKenna, 1985) is predicated on this kind of compensation 
for safety. Hitherto it has mostly been studied with regards to physical safety features, 
but it is also demonstrable where psychological and behavioural precautions are 
concerned. People who regularly use condoms perceive themselves to be at lower risk 
HIV infection (Thompson et al, 1996). The idea that training can actually increase 
risk taking was even alluded to by one of the participants himself: 
Interviewer: Do you think that some police drivers you know would benefit from 
further training? 
Officer 10: “Oh God yes definitely. The worst thing is when people just come off 
their driving test, there was an accident last night, chap just come off, lost it when he 
hit the central reservation, might have a broken bone and he had to go to hospital. 
When you have just come off driving test that’s the time when people have accidents, 
first six months, red mist time. They build you up, people think they are invincible 
because of all this building up, you go faster and faster and faster yes I can understand 
you want to be a confident driver but that’s the problem.” 
 
This idea that the ‘building-up’ process in training increases risk taking is consistent 
with our intimation from the interview material. Enhancing peoples’ awareness of 
hazards may increase their ability to justify themselves.  
 
In studies on naive participants, making them accountable for their driving skill 
reduces positive self-evaluations (McKenna & Myers, 1997). However, our 
participants appear to be expert account-givers - indeed, working as a police officer 
involves much of this activity, for example giving evidence, compiling reports and 
responding to inquiries from colleagues. The culture of many public service 
organisations emphasises the necessity of ensuring that practice is aligned with 
guidelines and regulations, so account-giving may well be more familiar and expertly 
accomplished by participants in our study.  This process of accounting for accidents 
which we have described in the present paper may also contain some clues towards 
the further investigation of accidents in other groups of drivers particularly 
professional drivers with additional driver training.  The tendency to attribute the 
causes of accidents to unfavourable conditions or to unpredictable behaviour from 
other drivers may well be detectable if one were to examine accounts of accidents 
more generally.  We would like to enter a plea for researchers and policy makers to 
consider seriously the process of account formulation when investigating accidents 
and conducting research on safety.  The methodology offers valuable insights into the 
potential relationship between organisational culture, stress and accident involvement, 
as an essential starting point for any investigation of safety issues. 
 
Thus, we would like to suggest a shift in the focus of risk study, towards an 
understanding of risk as a discursive phenomenon. Once we make sense of the stories 
people tell about hazards we might be able to genuinely improve training and enable 
people not merely to justify themselves or make claims that they are controlling their 
emotions, but to engage in a critical dialogue about driving practices. The participants 
are already expert in storytelling and new ways could be developed of utilising these 
skills to enable critical analysis rather than self-justificatory accounting. It might be 
possible to revise their implicit models of risk so they can see themselves as potential 
hazards rather than the other road users. In any event, the possibility that training and 
awareness on the part of drivers may increase the level of risk taken by drivers is one 
which must be taken very seriously in future research and policy on the issue. 
Although the present study is concerned with retrospective accounts, it highlights 
room for improvement in the cognitive skills of police drivers. Much driver training 
addresses ‘low’ level skills such as vehicle handling and very rarely considers ‘high’ 
level skills such as appraisal of the driving task demands. Cognitive competencies in 
making safety-oriented decisions are vital in training for police drivers and yet are the 
most difficult to train. In particular, a focus on operational and occupational safety 
through cognitive skills training is desirable. Strategies that change the internal 
context of cognition and motivation that a driver brings to the task can be addressed. 
There are a range of possible targets for specific maladaptive cognitions such as 
running a red light as a way of adhering to target response times. The vast majority of 
driver training programmes do not consider emotions and cognitions that are 
appropriate for driving; yet this study suggests their important role in driving 
behaviour. Officers in the present study frequently emphasised the importance of 
managing one’s own emotional and cognitive state whilst evaluating incidents and 
driving to them so training could profitably build upon this skill. There is also a need 
to focus on the question of self-confidence, since over-confident drivers may 
overestimate their skills, especially in emotionally charged situations (Joffe, 1999). 
Therefore, training should attempt to reorientate driving cognitions so that they are 
based in reality rather through distorted perceptions. One possible strategy for 
intervention might be the development of social skills for avoiding conflict such as 
defensive driving, anger management training, or even giving officers strategies to 
resist a peer culture which values rapid responses and aggressive driving techniques. 
  
Whereas much of the work of psychology on the process of risk taking has 
emphasised the relationship between this and stable, biologically-based personality 
factors (e.g. Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000) we have sought to open up another 
possibility. That is we have sought to show how the process of risk taking is 
connected with a variety of moment-to-moment practices of accounting, formulating 
events and assigning culpability for the hazard. The data presented above, we hope, 
will emphasise the way that living and working in a context of risk is a continuous 
accomplishment and is constructed and reconstructed by officers in situ using a set of 
linguistic conventions, culturally available resources of meaning and folk 
psychologies which afford and enable their daily work. Attending to these practices of 
accounting, formulating and narrating events will, we hope, bring researchers and 
policymakers into closer contact with the everyday practical accomplishment of living 
and working with risk. In this way these practices may be understood and even 
transformed so as to enhance safety for the public and officers alike. There is a real 
need to review police policy with respect to police driver training. A first step would 
be to incorporate the above recommendations to bring police driver training into line 
with community expectations and help improve the standards of police driving.  
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